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By Anastasios Nikolaidis 
 
 
Summary: The Pylos episode, ending with the capture of almost 300 Spartans who had 
been cut off on the Sphacteria island, was the first major setback suffered by Sparta dur-
ing the Peloponnesian war and, at the same time, the first major – and more importantly 
– unexpected success of Athens, in Peloponnesian territory at that. Without overlooking 
the military side involved, this paper will primarily focus on the political aspects of this 
enterprise in an attempt (a) to assess and evaluate Thucydides’ attitude to the protago-
nists of this episode, Cleon, Nicias and Demosthenes, (b) to better understand the histo-
rian’s political stance and judgement through the vocabulary that he employs, and (c) 
to show that his notoriously presumed bias against Cleon is poorly substantiated and, 




Thucydidean scholarship is unanimous, I think, on the importance of the 
Pylos affair. The Sicilian expedition aside, no other single episode of the 
war takes up almost one third of a book, and to no other single episode 
does Thucydides return time and again, however briefly, in three more 
books.1 Apart from its very interesting military aspects, this affair pro-
vides insights into the character, abilities, and the whole personality of 
such significant protagonists as Nicias, Cleon and Demosthenes, thus al-
lowing us (a) to assess and evaluate Thucydides’ attitude to these men, 
and (b) to explore the historian’s political judgement through some de-
 
1 From the 135 chapters of book 4, almost all of the first 46 concern the Pylos affair. 
But see also 5.14.3, 24.2, 34.2, 56.3, 110.2; 6.105.2; 7.18.3, 26.2, 71.7, 86.3. 
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tails that he stresses or omits as well as through the diction that he em-
ploys. But first, let us briefly be reminded of the circumstances that led 
to the Pylos episode.  
After the Athenian commander Demosthenes had somehow fortified 
Pylos in the spring of 425, the Spartans decided, inter alia, to put more 
than 400 soldiers on Sphacteria, the oblong island that closes the bay and 
the big harbour opposite the mainland, and block the entrances to it, so 
that the Athenians would not be able to support the men of their make-
shift fort there. The Athenian fleet, however, entered the bay, defeated 
the Spartans in a decisive sea-battle, and blockaded their soldiers on 
Sphacteria (4.14). Confronted with this calamity and greatly concerned 
for the safety of their marooned men, the Spartans sent an embassy to 
Athens with a general peace offer culminating in a proposal for a formal 
alliance between the two cities.2  
Thucydides bluntly recognizes that his compatriots, now having the 
upper hand, believed that they could obtain the peace of their choice any 
time they wished, and so they were greedy for more, as the Spartan en-
voys had feared they would and had tried to admonish them and talk 
them out of their avidity;3 toward which, he adds, they were mainly in-
cited by Cleon, a popular leader of that time with exceptional influence 
upon the multitude (4.21.3: μάλιστα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, 
ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει 
πιθανώτατος).4 The Athenian counter-proposals, therefore, were heavy 
 
2 See 4.17-20, esp. 19.1, and cf. also Ar. Pax 1082, and de Romilly 1963: 187. 
3 Cf. 4.17.4 and 21.2. A fortiori, the Athenians were reaching out for more after they 
had captured the Spartans of Sphacteria; cf. 4.41.4: οἱ δὲ μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο καὶ 
πολλάκις φοιτώντων (Spartan envoys kept coming to Athens to solicit peace) αὐτοὺς 
ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμπον. See also below n. 9. 
4 This description per se (as well as 4.22.2: Κλέων δ’ ἐνταῦθα πολὺς ἐνέκειτο [= pressed 
hard]) is, unwarrantedly in my view, regarded by Woodhead 1960: 311 as an indication 
of Thuc.’s bias against Cleon. For a politician to exert influence through his persua-
siveness is not a fault, and thus pithanōtatos is not a derogatory term (pace John Finley 
1940/1967: 285/154; Westlake 1968: 8; Dover 1973: 36; Kagan 1974: 234 n. 53), but 
rather a complimentary one; cf. also Hornblower 1991: 420 (‘not an unflattering 
word’) and Rhodes 1998: 220. As for δημαγωγός, a hapax in Thuc. (plus δημαγωγία 
in 8.65.2), even though this term was perhaps still free from the sinister connotations 
it subsequently acquired (see Westlake above), it can hardly be regarded, pace Gomme 
1956b: 461-62, as a respectable one; the quotation from Ar. Eq. 191-93, which Gomme 
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on the Spartans, yet their envoys agreed to discuss them all the same; 
not openly and in front of the whole assembly, though, but in a private 
session with the representatives whom the Athenian assembly would ap-
point; a quite reasonable request, given that the interests of the Spartan 
allies were also involved in these talks (4.22.1). Cleon, however, per-
suaded the Athenians to reject this request and even accused the Spartan 
envoys of duplicity. The latter eventually realized that the Athenians had 
no intention to grant their proposals on tolerable conditions and left 
Athens.5 Interestingly, we hear nothing of Nicias in connection with this 
Spartan embassy, and generally Thucydides’ account gives the impres-
sion that the Athenian mood was so openly warlike that Cleon simply 
took advantage of this mood and perhaps exacerbated it even more. This 
might also explain why Thucydides chose not to provide the Athenian 
counter-speech to the Spartan proposals; finding, that is, the arguments 
of the envoys weak and unconvincing – let alone the unbearably didactic 
tone of their speech which probably made their rejection easier – and 
Nicias’(?) counter-arguments in favour of accepting the Spartan peace 
offer not particularly compelling either, Thucydides decided against tak-
ing down Cleon’s spectacular show of belligerence and his easy public 
triumph.6 Yet, other sources suggest that the situation may not have 
 
himself adduces, seems to suggest the opposite, I think. Cf. also Classen & Steup 1900: 
45; Moses Finley 1962: 4-5; 1972: 56, 58, and John Finley 1967: 154-55. At Xen. Hell. 
5.2.7 demagōgos is already a derogatory term. 
5 See Kagan’s 1974: 231-38 relevant account and cf. Westlake 1968: 65-66. 
6 Cf. Cornford 1971: 125 and Hornblower 1996: 170 (Thuc. ‘was unwilling to dwell on 
Cleon’s victory in the debate’). Most scholars, on the basis of 4.21.2, 27.2, 5.14.2, 
believe that Thuc. favoured the acceptance of the Spartan proposals: Adcock 1927: 
233-34; Finley 1942: 194-95; de Romilly 1963: 172-77; Westlake 1968: 68-69 and n. 
1; Kagan 1974: 232; Rhodes 1998: 220. Yet this does not necessarily mean that Thuc. 
was convinced by the Spartan arguments, as Gomme 1956b: 460 and Connor 1984: 
113 n. 10 point out. It may be worth noting also that 5.14.2 (μετεμέλοντό τε ὅτι μετὰ 
τὰ ἐν Πύλῳ καλῶς παρασχὸν οὐ ξυνέβησαν – ‘they regretted not having come to terms 
[sc. with the Spartans] when a good opportunity arose after the events at Pylos’), may 
well be an a posteriori assessment and, in any case, it reflects the Athenian feelings 
and mood in 421, not in 425. On the other hand, Marshall’s 1984: 20, 28 and 32 view 
that ‘Thucydides really wishes Sparta had won, and regards the Athenian victory [sc. 
at Pylos-Sphacteria] as aischron’, is extreme and totally groundless. 
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been so clear-cut: Plutarch, to begin with, implies that Nicias was in fa-
vour of the Spartan peace offer, contrary to Cleon who urged the Athe-
nians (and eventually persuaded them) to reject it (4.22.2).7  Then we 
have a fragment of Philochorus suggesting that the assembly was divided 
over Cleon’s negative recommendation, but the supporters of war pre-
vailed in the end.8 Philochorus’ fragment in its entirety is indeed some-
what muddled, as Westlake (1968: 69 n. 2) and Hornblower (1996: 177) 
note, but it cannot be ignored. Aristophanes’ Peace, produced in 421, 
might refer to this ambivalent assembly meeting,9 and the ancient scho-
liast here seems to agree with Philochorus’ information.10 
 
7 Cf. also Plut. Nic. 7.2: ἀπεώσαντο δὲ Κλέωνος ἐναντιωθέντος οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ Νικίαν· 
ἐχθρὸς γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ, καὶ προθύμως ὁρῶν συμπράττοντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἔπεισε 
τὸν δῆμον ἀποψηφίσασθαι τὰς σπονδάς (the Athenians ‘repulsed [the Spartan em-
bassy] because Cleon, chiefly because of Nicias, spoke against it; for Nicias was his 
political enemy and, as he saw him zealously cooperating with the Lacedaemonians, 
persuaded the popular assembly to reject the truce’ – transl. Perrin [Loeb]). 
8 Jacoby1954: 407 (on 328F128): Κλέωνος δὲ ἀπειπόντος ταῖς διαλύσεσι στασιάσαι 
λέγεται τὴν ἐκκλησίαν … ἐνίκησαν δὲ οἱ πολεμεῖν βουλόμενοι. Rhodes 1998: 221 also 
refers to Philochorus, but regards his information as ‘unlikely to be right’. 
9 Cf. Pax 211-19, 665-67 (ἐλθοῦσά φησιν αὐτομάτη μετὰ τἀν Πύλῳ / σπονδῶν φέρουσα 
τῇ πόλει κίστην πλέαν ἀποχειροτονηθῆναι τρὶς ἐν τἠκκλησίᾳ – ‘when, after the events 
at Pylos, she [sc. Peace] came here of her own accord offering to the city a basket full 
of treaties, she was voted down three times in the assembly’) and cf. de Romilly 1967: 
178 (on 4.21.2), Gomme 1956b: 461 ad loc., and Lewis 1992: 416. See also Ar. Eq. 
668-74, 794-97, and cf. Neil 1901: 115. Yet Sommerstein 1985: 164 and Olson 1998: 
111 hold that the above lines from Pax and Equites refer to Thuc. 4.41.3-4 and the 
later pacific attempts of the Spartans. Cf. also Gomme 1956b: 482 and Hornblower 
1996: 197. 
10 Jacoby’s remarks (above n. 8) that Thuc. 4.21.2 only seemingly conveys the impres-
sion that the mood of the assembly was uniform (cf. also Hornblower 1996: 177) and 
that ‘the report as a whole shows that opinions were divided, and Cleon was obliged 
to speak twice’ are not very cogent. Cleon did speak twice indeed, yet not in this but 
in the following assembly (4.27-28) and only after he was somehow impelled to accept 
the command; not because the opinions were divided. Flower 1992: 42-45, 46-47, 49, 
56-57 argues that the unclarity over the situation is due to the fact that Thuc. failed to 
record the assembly that had discussed Demosthenes’ request for reinforcements and 
had voted the Pylos campaign to Nicias. Hornblower 1996: 170 adopts Flower’s sug-
gestion, but Gomme’s (1956b: 468) explanation at 4.28.3 renders it unnecessary: ‘Ni-
cias, as strategos, would have good claim to their command’ (sc. of the reinforcements 
that might be sent) and so no special assembly was needed for that; cf. also Classen & 
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Be that as it may, after the rejection of the Spartan peace proposals, 
the war was resumed, but concerning the situation at Pylos a stalemate 
ensued. The Athenian blockade of Sphacteria proved not entirely suc-
cessful, while the besiegers themselves were also harassed by the scant-
iness of food and water in an uninhabited and rather barren place. Upon 
realizing the distress of their army and in view of the winter (which 
would naturally make things worse), the Athenians repented having re-
jected the Spartan peace offer (4.27.2: καὶ μετεμέλοντο τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ 
δεξάμενοι),11 and Cleon could easily figure out that it was he whom they 
were mostly blaming for their current predicament.12 So, when another 
assembly met to discuss the situation, he first denied that the conditions 
in the Athenian camp were so distressful as reported; but, challenged to 
go and see things for himself, he dismissed this mission as a waste of time 
and proposed instead that they should immediately send out reinforce-
ments, land on Sphacteria and capture the Spartans there. It was an easy 
matter, he added, pointing at Nicias, and something that our generals 
should have already done, if they were real men, and, in any case, this 
was what he himself would have done, had he been in their place.13 
Some critics now have overinterpreted, I think, if not misinterpreted, 
Thucydides in this passage. Hornblower (1996: 186), for instance, com-
menting on Cleon’s realization that the Athenian discontent was being 
directed against him (naturally of course, since it was he who had 
thwarted the acceptance of the Spartan peace proposals), adopts Mabel 
 
Steup 1900: 62. Philochorus’ fragment suggests, then, that, despite his persuasiveness, 
Cleon’s victory was not so easy as Thuc. allows us to suppose (incidentally, neither in 
the Mytilenean debate was Cleon in the end persuasive; see 3.49.1). 
11 As they also repented for a similar reason at 4.41.3-4 and 5.14.2. Thuc. disagreed and 
criticized his compatriots for all these rejections of peace which he regarded as a major 
strategic blunder (see esp. 5.14.2), according to Olson 1998: xxvi and 112. See also de 
Romilly 1963: 177, 186-87, where she argues that Thuc. gradually changed his views 
and became more of a pacifist, whereas he initially approved of Pericles’ imperialistic 
policies and his firm opposition to Sparta. But see also n. 6. 
12 So also Grote 1872: 247. 
13 4.27.5: καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν … ῥᾴδιον εἶναι 
παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, καὶ 
αὐτός γ’ ἄν ἦρχε, ποιῆσαι τοῦτο. For a similar appeal to manliness cf. 3.14.2 and see 
also below n. 54. 
ANASTASIOS NIKOLAIDIS  126 
Lang’s (1995) observations on Thucydides’ technique to ascribe motives 
through the use of participles, and regards the use of the participles 
γνοὺς, ὁρῶν, ὡρμημένους below as evidence of Thucydides’ arbitrary at-
tribution of motives, and by extension as evidence of his bias against 
Cleon (4.27.3):14  
 
Κλέων δὲ γνοὺς αὐτῶν τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν ὑποψίαν περὶ τῆς κωλύμης τῆς 
ξυμβάσεως … 27.4: καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι αναγκασθήσεται ἢ ταὐτὰ λέγειν οἷς 
διέβαλλεν ἢ τἀναντία εἰπὼν ψευδὴς φανήσεσθαι, παρῄνει τοῖς 
Ἀθηναίοις, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὡρμημένους … στρατεύειν, ὡς χρὴ, … εἰ 
δὲ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας. 
 
But Cleon, knowing that their suspicions were directed against him 
because he had prevented the agreement … 27.4: and realizing now 
that he would either be obliged to bring the same report as the mes-
sengers whose word he was impugning, or, if he contradicted them, 
be convicted of falsehood, he advised the Athenians, also seeing that 
they were now somewhat more inclined to send an expedition, that … 
if they themselves thought the reports to be true, to send a fleet and 
fetch the men (transl. Smith [Loeb] slightly modified). 
 
But ‘The idea of Cleon confiding his thoughts and plans to Thucydides 
seems absurd’, Lang (1995: 50) argues, Thucydides could not have known 
what Cleon had in mind, and so by writing ‘Κλέων γνούς’ and ‘Κλέων 
ὁρῶν’, he arbitrarily ascribes concrete motives to him. Almost thirty 
years earlier Westlake (1968: 72) also remarked that Thucydides ‘tacitly 
claims to see into the mind of Cleon and to know precisely why he acted 
as he did at each stage of the [Pylos] debate’. And Woodhead (1960: 313), 
one of the most eminent admirers of Cleon, made the same diagnosis 
 
14 Hornblower 1996: 185: ‘One of Thuc.’s least objective sections’. Cf. also Lewis 1992: 
417 (‘redolent of bias and dislike’), and Westlake 1968: 70 (Thuc. purposely expatiates 
on the Pylos episode, because it affords ‘the opportunity of underlining the personal 
failings of Cleon’; cf. also p. 75). Yet Grote 1872: 246-48 and Gomme 1956b: 468 (on 
4.27.4) see no bias against Cleon on the part of Thuc. here (and with justice so). 
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even earlier.15 To my mind, however, the situation is so clear that no psy-
chologist or Sherlock Holmes is required here to perceive the self-evi-
dent; for it was absolutely natural and expected that Cleon should have 
felt (γνούς) the tide of opinion moving against him, after the news about 
the multiple distress of the Athenian army at Pylos had reached Athens.16 
Thus, Cleon’s first, almost instinctive, reaction was to deny the veracity 
of the report, then, challenged to go and inspect the situation himself, he 
realized (γνούς) that the report might be true after all and so he refused 
to go, while seeing (ὁρῶν) in the sequel that the Athenians were inclined 
to send an expedition anyhow (ὡρμημένους … στρατεύειν),17 he urged 
them to do this right away; exactly as he had inflamed their belligerent 
mood one month or so earlier with the Spartan embassy pleading for 
peace.18 Almost anyone present at that assembly could deduce all this, 
regardless of his feelings or opinion about Cleon; logical deductions after 
all are legitimate and do not necessarily indicate prejudice;19 and if Thu-
cydides was present at that assembly, as it is very probable that he was,20 
he was an eyewitness of Cleon’s reactions and the successive shifting of 
his position and simply described them; he did not need to discover and 
 
15 Similarly Dover 1973: 31 and Kagan 2009: 133. But see below n. 24. 
16 See also Lewis 1992: 417. 
17 Why were the Athenians now inclined to send an expedition? Apparently because, 
contrary to Cleon’s (probably) sham protests (see below pp. 139 and n. 63), they be-
lieved the messengers’ reports from Pylos (4.27.3: οὐ τἀληθῆ ἔφη [sc. Cleon] λέγειν 
τοὺς ἐξαγγέλλοντας. Παραινούντων δὲ τῶν ἀφιγμένων, εἰ μὴ σφίσι πιστεύουσι, 
κατασκόπους τινὰς πέμψαι…), who in all likelihood must also have requested rein-
forcements; see below n. 66. 
18 Cf. 4.21.2-3 and see de Romilly 1963: 203 with n. 1 and 174 with n. 2. The chrono-
logical sequence of the main Pylos events, as can be gathered from 4.39.1-2 and other 
calculations is the following: Late May-beginning of June: The Athenian victory in the 
bay and the start of Sphacteria blockade (Wilson 1979: 126; Gomme 1956b: 478: not 
earlier than May 25-30; cf. also p. 719). First fortnight of June: Spartan envoys in 
Athens unsuccessfully soliciting peace. Middle July: The assembly meeting that de-
cides to send Cleon to Pylos (Gomme 478: c. July 28). Beginning of August: The final 
victory and the surrender of the Spartans (August 1, according to Wilson: 126; August 
5-10, according to Gomme: 478 and 487). On these chronological estimates cf. also 
Rhodes 1998: 232 (on 39.1). 
19 See, for instance, Westlake 1968: 79 n. 2. 
20 Cf. Woodhead 1960: 315 and Westlake 1968: 73 n. 1. 
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attribute motives, because Cleon’s intentions and corresponding behav-
iour unfolded in the broad daylight and were therefore public and visible 
to all. As Westlake (1968: 73) remarks, Thucydides “may well be perfectly 
right in his interpretation of each move by Cleon throughout this epi-
sode; the available evidence certainly does not provide adequate grounds 
for believing that any of his interpretations must be wrong”, regardless 
of the fact that one could also argue for different interpretations, as 
Westlake himself does in the sequel.21 Pace, therefore, the opinion of the 
scholars who defend Cleon and find fault with Thucydides here, I think 
that Gomme’s (1956b: 468) reading of the same passage is more trenchant 
and right on the mark: ‘There was no question’, he notes (on 4.27.4), ‘of 
Cleon’s leading the people or opposing them; he observed which way the 
wind was blowing before making his proposal’.22  
The foregoing observations are not intended to question the useful-
ness of Lang’s study; for participial motivation is indeed a feature of Thu-
cydides’ narrative technique, as Lang 1995: 53 has convincingly estab-
lished. Yet the motivation of an action, whether emerging from mere ob-
servation or from elementary reasoning, is often fairly obvious and does 
not necessarily presuppose direct factual knowledge or reading the 
doer’s mindset, as Lang (1995: 50-51) seems to postulate. If either of the 
latter was inescapably required, passing judgements would become al-
most impossible in many cases; and insofar as there are cases where the 
motives of individuals are entirely obvious or may legitimately be in-
ferred from their recorded actions or from the situation in which they 
 
21 Sure, Westlake 1968: 73-74 notes that there are more interpretations of Cleon’s be-
haviour, but this does not prove that the historian’s one was dictated by his bias against 
Cleon. All interpretations are subjective after all (see Westlake’s protest on p. 73n. 1), 
but their trustworthiness is tested on the criterium of their logical coherence and plau-
sibility; see Westlake 1968: 79n. 2. 
22 Cf. also Marshall 1984: 21. That Cleon’s proposal was ‘eminently sensible’, as 
Gomme above adds, is a completely different matter, of course. 
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were involved or from subsequent developments, as Westlake convinc-
ingly argues elsewhere,23 I cannot see why Cleon’s motives on the epi-
sode above may not belong to one of these cases.24  
However – to return to the second Pylos debate – no decision has been 
taken as yet and Cleon faces, during the same assembly meeting, a second 
and far more important challenge. At first, he was asked, as we saw, to go 
and check for himself if the reports from Pylos were true, but this chal-
lenge he smartly eluded by overriding the desire of the multitude to send 
an expedition; yet now that Nicias, whom he had practically called a cow-
ard (see n. 13), offers to resign his command and urges him, along with 
the crowd of Cleon’s own supporters, we may guess, to take any force he 
 
23 For motives deducible from recorded actions see Westlake 1989: 201, 205, 210; de-
ducible from the context or pertinent situations see 201, 204, 222n. 24; deducible from 
subsequent developments see Westlake 1947: 28 with n. 1; cf. also 4.79.2 and 83.1, 6. 
Elsewhere Westlake 1962: 283-84 maintains that Thuc. does not as a rule ‘give infor-
mation about the motives and feelings of individuals based upon mere surmise or even 
upon inference from his knowledge of their character’ (with the exception of Cleon 
and Nicias though; see id 1980: 333 n. 3 and 1968: 69-85, esp. 83 and 93-6). He must 
be right in most cases, but since the sources of Thuc.’s information are not always 
verifiable, the possibility that some of his judgements may rely on mere surmise or 
inference from knowledge of the character of the personage concerned cannot be ruled 
out; see also id. 1989: 201, 207; Dover 1973: 31, and also next note. 
24 Another source for discerning motives and intentions is good information: with refer-
ence to the moderate terms which Brasidas offered to the people of Amphipolis, for 
example (4.105.2, 108.2), Westlake 1962: 283 believes that they were moderate be-
cause the Spartan commander had heard about Thucydides’ mining interests in the 
area and feared that his arrival with ships from Thasos would stiffen the will of the 
Amphipolitans to resist (4.105.1); this, Westlake argues, must be ‘an authentic report 
of what Brasidas thought’, as our historian was ‘remarkably well-informed about the 
motives and feelings of Brasidas on many occasions’ (see p. 284 n. 2 and cf. Westlake 
1980: 334). Yet it is not at all certain that this information was derived directly from 
Brasidas (see p. 333 n. 3 and 339: ‘Direct contact between Thucydides and Brasidas 
seems unlikely’; cf. also Westlake 1989: 205; apparently a change of mind after 1968: 
148), whom Thuc. may have met and questioned while in exile (so Adcock 1927: 243 
and Proctor in Westlake 1989: 205 n. 14). True, Thuc. to be sure never inquired of 
Cleon about his motives and intentions, as he might have done with Brasidas; but why, 
if his own judgement and percipience as an eyewitness at that crucial assembly of 425 
were not enough, could he not have been informed about them through Demosthenes, 
a close collaborator of Cleon and one of Thuc.’s sources (see below p. 150 and n. 65), 
or some other friend or supporter of Cleon? 
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wanted, sail to Pylos, and try to do better himself, Cleon could not evade 
any longer despite his initial refusal.25 Thus, not only does he accept the 
command, but also he promises, apparently to everyone’s astonishment 
that, within the following twenty days he will either capture and bring 
the Spartan garrison of Sphacteria to Athens alive or slay them all on the 
spot; and this without taking a single Athenian soldier with him, except 
some light troops that happened to be in Athens at that time and 400 
archers from other places (4.28.4).26 Cleon’s frivolous promise (κουφο-
λογία), so unnecessarily specific,27 even made the Athenians laugh, Thu-
cydides tells us, but the sound-minded (sōphrones) among them took 
pleasure in the thought that they would profit from either eventuality: 
 
25 4.28.2-4: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι, ἑτοῖμος ἦν, γνοὺς δὲ τῷ 
ὄντι παραδωσείοντα ἀνεχώρει καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνον στρατηγεῖν … 28.3: οἱ 
δέ, … ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν πλοῦν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ 
ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν· 28.4: ὥστε 
οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν εἰρημένων ἔτι εξαπαλλαγῇ, ὑφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν. One might read 
the above scene as a duel of bluffing wits: Cleon offends Nicias, but does not expect 
to go to Pylos instead of him; Nicias offers the command to Cleon, but does not expect 
him to accept it. (I owe this remark to a relevant point in the report of the anonymous 
referee). 
26 Cf. also below p. 139 and nn. 63 and 65. 
27 Κουφολογία is the light or empty or thoughtless talk (‘levitas verborum’, according to 
Bétant’s 1843-47 Lexicon; ‘propos étourdis’, according to de Romilly 1967: 21, a con-
sistent manifestation of Cleon’s vanity (κουφότης) in general (see Plutarch’s example 
of it at Nic. 7.6-7). On the braggadocio and irresponsibility of Cleon’s promise see 
Lewis 1992: 418 and Rhodes 1998: 227. Thuc. calls it mad (μανιώδης) at 4.39.3, and 
Gomme 1956b: 479 rightly explains that the promise was mad not because it was most 
unlikely to be fulfilled per se, but to be fulfilled within a fixed time-limit in the midst 
of military operations. Cf. also the ancient scholiast ad loc. (Hude 1927: 249: 
μανιώδης· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος προπετὴς ἀπόφασις). For Grote 1872: 260-
61, however, Cleon’s promise was not at all presumptuous, but, on the contrary, ‘a 
reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future’. Similarly Kagan 1974: 244 
and 247 n. 99. As for the 20 days time-limit, it was not tight, according to Wilson 
1979: 124-25 and, as Vlachos 1970: 130 put it, ‘une fois l’opération engagée, elle ne 
pouvait être que très rapidement menée et c’est sur cette donnée que table, fort 
justement, Cléon’. 
REVISITING THE PYLOS EPISODE  131 
they would either get rid of Cleon, which they rather expected, or Cleon 
would indeed manage to capture the Spartans of Sphacteria for them.28  
George Grote was furious with the aforesaid sōphrones and established 
a school by proclaiming their conduct a treacherous one. Because, as he 
puts it (p. 251): 
 
‘Of all the parties here concerned, those whose conduct is the most 
unpardonably disgraceful are Nicias and his oligarchical supporters; 
who force a political enemy into the supreme command against his 
own strenuous protest,29 persuaded that he will fail so as to compro-
mise the lives of many soldiers and the destinies of the state on an 
important emergency – but satisfying themselves with the idea that 
they shall bring him to ruin.’30  
 
And (p. 250):  
 
‘…while his [sc. Cleon’s] political adversaries (Nicias among them) are 
deplorably timid, ignorant and reckless of the public interest; seeking 
only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party-
opportunity for ruining him’. 
 
This approach, which has largely been adopted by most modern scholars, 
is, in my view, another case of over-interpretation of what Thucydides 
actually says, no matter if one agrees or disagrees with the historian’s 
opinion here. First, we ought to observe that the Athenian assembly did 
not comprise only the sōphrones, namely Nicias’ oligarchical supporters 
according to Grote;31 Cleon’s supporters were also there, of course, and 
 
28 4.28.5: Τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μέν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἀσμένοις 
δ’ ὅμως ἐγίνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου 
τεύξεσθαι, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης 
Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι. 
29 But for this strenuous protest see also below n. 62. 
30 Cf. also Dover 1973: 37; Westlake 1968: 70 speaks more generally of ‘the irresponsi-
bility of the Athenian assembly’, not only of the sōphrones. 
31 According to Plut. Nic. 2.2, Nicias was primarily supported by the rich and notable as 
an opposing force to Cleon’s repulsive brazenness (ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ γνωρίμων 
ἀντίταγμα … Κλέωνος βδελυρίαν καὶ τόλμαν), but was held in some repute already 
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most probably outnumbered the sōphrones; yet their own responsibility 
and share in the decision taken is not criticized by the denouncers of the 
latter. The argument that Cleon’s supporters believed that their leader 
would succeed does not necessarily mean that his opponents considered 
the feasibility of the operation impossible, irrespective of how they as-
sessed Cleon’s chances. Graves (1884: 168), for instance, remarks that 
these Athenians, the sōphrones, ‘may have considered the enterprise fea-
sible, but were not unwilling that its risks should fall upon Cleon, while 
they knew that Demosthenes would be at hand to advise and direct’; and 
certainly, we may add, the destinies of Athens were hardly compromised 
on this occasion, as Grote’s exaggerated rhetoric wants us to believe. Af-
ter all, Grote himself argues that this operation, given the enormous mil-
itary inequality between the two armies, must have been fairly easy and 
that failure would imply ‘an idea not only of superhuman power in the 
Lacedaemonian hoplites, but a disgraceful incapacity on the part of De-
mosthenes and the assailants’ (260). But if so, neither the lives of many 
soldiers nor the destinies of the state would actually be compromised, as 
the outcome of the operation bore out after all.32  
Further, there is nothing in Thucydides suggesting that the conduct 
of Nicias and his oligarchical supporters, the sōphrones of 4.28.5, is unpar-
donably disgraceful, and nowhere in Thucydides is Nicias charged with 
cowardice. But Grote as well as those who agree with him all of a sudden 
choose to part company with Thucydides at this juncture and follow in-
stead Plutarch’s account, an author who writes five centuries later and 
whose historical acumen and judgement, incidentally, they hardly ad-
mire otherwise. In any case, Plutarch alone writes that Nicias resigned 
 
since Pericles’ time (ἦν μὲν ἔν τινι λόγῳ καὶ Περικλέους ζῶντος), and well-liked by 
the common people too, who supported his ambitions (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δῆμον εἶχεν 
εὔνουν καὶ συμφιλοτιμούμενον). 
32 Cf. 4.38.5: Ἀθηναίων δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν (see Gomme 1956b: 478). For the 
relative easiness of the operation and perfect feasibility of Demosthenes’ plan and 
Cleon’s promise see also Kagan 1974: 244-47 and n. 99. However, even recently 
Tompkins 2017: 106, discussing 4.28.5 (n. 28), wonders ‘how … could “prudent” men 
hope for disaster’. 
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his command to Cleon out of cowardice and regards this act as disgrace-
ful and detrimental to the interests of Athens.33 Yet, no other ancient 
source supports this assessment and, more importantly, we do know – 
and we cannot overlook this fact – that in the Life of Nicias Plutarch, the 
biographer, has his own axe to grind, and that his Nicias must be read 
along with his pair, Crassus, if we want a thorough and trustworthy eval-
uation of the two men; and these are factors that may offer another ex-
planation of Plutarch’s attitude toward Nicias, as I have argued in detail 
elsewhere.34 Besides, the fact that some years later Nicias offers to resign 
also his Sicily command, a far more important assignment,35 and this de-
spite his supposed disgrace in the Pylos affair, allows perhaps the suspi-
cion at least that what Plutarch considered to be disgraceful five centu-
ries after the Pylos episode – and a fortiori what modern era regards as 
such – might not coincide after all with the pertinent viewpoint of most 
people in those times and those circumstances. For as we shall see below, 
Nicias was not at all disgraced on account of his resigning the Pylos com-
mand. Conclusion: Plutarch’s evidence here cannot, I believe, annul or 
thrust aside that of Thucydides. 
However, what the historian says at 4.28.5 (n. 28) does indeed give rise 
to several queries and is open to various interpretations. What is, for in-
stance, the ultimate meaning of ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι in that context? Did the 
 
33 Plut., Nic. 8.2: Οὐ γὰρ ἀσπίδος ῥῖψις, ἀλλ’ αἴσχιόν τι καὶ χεῖρον ἐδόκει τὸ δειλίᾳ τὴν 
στρατηγίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἑκουσίως … 8.5: καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔβλαψεν οὐ μικρὰ τῷ Κλέωνι 
τοσοῦτον προσγενέσθαι δόξης ἐάσας καὶ δυνάμεως … (‘Nicias was thought not merely 
to have cast away his shield, but to have done something far more disgraceful and base 
in voluntarily throwing up his command out of cowardice … and besides, he wrought 
no little harm to the city in allowing Cleon to acquire such a high reputation and polit-
ical power…’ -- Perrin’s transl. [Loeb] with slight modifications); cf. also Comp. Nic.-
Cr. 3.1,3,5. 
34 See Nikolaidis 1988: 331-33. 
35 Cf. 6.23.4: ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς 
στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια. εἰ δὲ τῳ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν (‘For these 
precautions I regard as not only surest for the whole state but also as safeguards for us 
who are to go on the expedition. But if it seem otherwise to anyone, I yield the com-
mand to him’ – transl. Smith [Loeb]). Pace Rhodes 1998: 227, his reference to 7.15.1 
as a similar case is unfortunate; Nicias does not actually resign his command there, but 
only asks the Athenians to replace him because he is sick and cannot perform his du-
ties. 
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sōphrones expect Cleon to get killed or simply to fail in carrying the oper-
ation through? If he only failed, why would they necessarily get rid of 
him? More importantly, on what grounds did they believe that Cleon had 
more chances of being killed or failing than of succeeding? I shall discuss 
these questions in turn, but first I will try to address, opening a paren-
thesis at this point, another crucial question: who were these sōphrones? 
Despite the etymological transparency of the term σώφρων (σῶς, 
sound + φρὴν, mind), Thucydides’ use of the words sōphrōn and 
sōphrosynē is very complex because, following the practice of the Soph-
ists, he too played with several possible meanings or shades of meaning 
according to the context.36  Helen North (1966: 100-1) astutely argued 
that the contrast between Athens and Sparta, one of the major themes in 
his History, often takes the form of a contrast between rival conceptions 
of sōphrosynē. Extreme though this view may initially sound, it is very 
well documented. Sōphrosynē in its primary sense arising from the ety-
mology of the word (i.e. sound-mindedness),37 is a Spartan quality par ex-
cellence;38 and so are such qualities as orderliness (εὐταξία), propriety or 
decorum (εὔκοσμον, κοσμιότης, αἰδώς) , quiet or peacefulness (ἡσυχία), 
abstention from politics (ἀπραγμοσύνη), slowness in action and procras-
tination (βραδυτής, μέλλησις) out of concern for safety (ἀσφάλεια) and 
so forth, as natural consequences of sound-mindedness or prudence.39 
The Spartans themselves regard the quality of sōphrosynē as peculiarly 
their own (see nn. 38 and 41), their allies openly recognize this fact and 
appeal to it, 40  and thus democratic Athens, as opposed to oligarchic 
 
36 See Georgiadou 1988: 140, 142, Gomme 1956a: 301, and more generally North 1966: 
100-16. 
37 According to Bétant’s 1843-47 Thucydidean Lexicon, the two primary connotations 
of sōphrosynē are sapientia and prudentia (the other two moderatio and modestia). 
38 Cf. 1.84.2-3. Also 1.79.2, North 1966: 102-4, Edmunds 1975: 74 and 79. 
39 See, for instance, 1.32.4-5, 69.4-5, 70.4, 8, 71.1-4, 84.1-3, 124.1-2, 8.1.3. See also 
North 1966: 101-4, and cf. [Arist.], VV 1250b12: παρέπεται δὲ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξία, 
κοσμιότης, αἰδώς, εὐλάβεια (caution). 
40 See, e.g., 1.68.1 and 3.59.1 with Gomme 1956: vol. 2, 345. See also Georgiadou 1988: 
142-43, 192-93 and North 1966: 102. 
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Sparta, is not very keen on laying claim to this quality.41  The words 
sōphrōn and sōphrosynē are missing from all Pericles’ speeches (the terms 
metrios and metriotēs are used instead),42 and Thucydides never calls Per-
icles sōphrōn,43 although in his celebrated portrait of him at 2.65 he de-
scribes him exactly as such (2.65.5):44 
 
Ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως 
ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν … 7: … ἡσυχάζοντάς τε … καὶ 
ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας 
ἔφη περιέσεσθαι. 
 
For so long as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of peace 
he pursued a moderate policy and kept the city in safety … 7: … for he 
had told the Athenians that if they would maintain a defensive policy 
… and not seek to extend their sway during the war or do anything to 
imperil the existence of the state, they would prove superior (transl. 
Smith [Loeb])  
 
In view of the above, it is difficult, I think, to dissociate the sōphrones of 
4.28.5 from the political dimension of the term, in other words, to avoid 
their connection with aristocratic principles and oligarchic-sympathis-
ers in Athens. Gomme (1956b: 470) and other scholars deny this and 
maintain that the word sōphrones here bears only its primary and generic 
 
41 For sōphrosynē as a Spartan and a more or less oligarchic (aristocratic) quality see n. 
38 and further 8.1.3, 24.4, 53.3, 64.5. See also North 1966: 112 (‘Sôphrôn is the oper-
ative word denoting oligarchy’); Edmunds 1975: 76 and n. 17 ibid. (‘an oligarchic 
slogan’), and cf. Gomme 1956a: 300 and 379 on 3.37.3 and 3.82.8; Dover 1973: 37; 
Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1981: 159-61; Georgiadou 1988: 143-46; Hornblower 
1991: 77 (on 1.32.4), 124-5 (on 1.79.2), 486 (on 3.82.8); Tompkins 2017: 106; see also 
Balot 2017: 331-32. 
42 See, for instance, 1.76.4, 77.2, 2.65.5 and cf. North 1966: 102, 104-6, and Gomme, 
Andrewes & Dover 1981: 160. Cf. also n. 37. 
43 But in Isocr. 16.28 Pericles is praised as σωφρονέστατον, δικαιότατον καὶ σοφώτατον 
τῶν πολιτῶν, while Aristotle describes him as φρόνιμος (Eth. Nic. 1140b8). 
44 Thus, the aforementioned concomitant qualities of sōphrosynē are also shared by the 
Athenians at times; cf. Georgiadou 1988: 142-43, 195-96. For Thucydides’ own views 
about sōphrosynē and its political significance, see North 1966: 113 (8.24.4-5; 53.3; 
64.5; 97.2). 
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meaning and thus simply refers to the sensible and prudent men of the 
assembly at large. That these sensible men might have laughed at Cleon’s 
frivolous promise is perfectly understandable, but why would the same 
persons have looked forward to his ruin, whether physical or political, if 
a factional or political more broadly antithesis was not also simmering? 
On the other hand, some critics believe that the use of the term sōphrones 
here is ironic, given the successful outcome of the Sphacteria enterprise 
and the fulfillment of Cleon’s promise.45 Yet, this reading is not particu-
larly convincing either. For, if the use of sōphrones here is ironic, it must 
be self-ironic, because Thucydides, who calls Cleon’s promise mad, as we 
shall see (4.39.3), would certainly have included himself among those 
sōphrones.46 Thucydides now does occasionally make ironic remarks – he 
often sneers, for example, at the religiosity of the Spartans which he re-
gards as specious,47 but I can find no instance where he sneers at himself.  
Here the parenthesis on sōphrosynē in Thucydides closes and we may 
proceed to the other questions which the historian’s description at 4.28.5 
engenders. In what sense did the sōphrones expect to get rid of Cleon? 
 
45 Cf., e.g., Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1981: 160, Babut 1986: 73, Georgiadou 1988: 
144, and more recently Flower 1992: 56 and Tompkins 2017: 106. However, Horn-
blower 1996: 188 rightly, in my view, denies the ironic dimension of the sōphrones 
here. 
46 This was Gomme’s opinion too (1956b: 469: ‘Thucydides doubtless reflected that he 
had been one of this group of ‘sensible men’ at that time’); see also Rhodes: 1998: 
227, but Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1981:160 seem to disagree; and so does Flower 
1992: 56, who dissociates Thucydides from the sōphrones above. 
47 Finley 1942: 311-12. For another ironic remark of Thuc. (Cleon being the butt) see 
5.7.3, but on the whole ‘irony is not a characteristic of the Thucydidean narrative’, as 
Westlake 1960: 393 with n. 34 rightly observes. On the contrary, Connor 1984: 36 n. 
36 sees irony in many passages of the History, on the basis that the author knows that 
the reality eventually contradicted or conflicted with what a character had expected or 
affirmed or simply said on a certain occasion (see his ‘irony’ index on p. 264). But 
these instances are not necessarily ironical, in my view (cf. also Hornblower’s 2008: 
211 criticism on 5.82.5); nor is 6.23.3, pace Hornblower 2008: 359, while at 3.83.8 
(ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει), pace Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1981:160, 
there is no irony at all (see Gomme 1956a: 379) and, if there is, it refers to the noun 
aristokratia, not to the adjective sōphron (see Hornblower 1991: 486 on 3.82.8). 
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Could they really have thought it more likely that Cleon would be killed48 
in a comparatively easy operation (see n. 32) or is what we have here 
simply an inadvertent expression of wishful thinking on the part of Thu-
cydides? More on this shortly. The evidence, on the other hand, from the 
Knights of Aristophanes, produced soon after the events of Pylos and 
taken within the whole context of this play, appears to suggest the polit-
ical rather than the physical ruin of Cleon;49 thus, it is perhaps safer to 
take ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι in its general meaning and suppose that, if Cleon 
failed, as was rather expected, his disgrace would be so great, especially 
after his silly and boastful promise (see n. 27), that it would automatically 
put him out of the political arena once and for all. This is how the 
sōphrones may have seen things, as other critics also believe.50 However, 
the political career of Nicias who was discredited – if only superficially, 
as it seems – by Cleon’s success, did not suffer any setback: as soon as 
Cleon returns triumphantly with the Spartan prisoners to Athens, it is 
Nicias who, as elected stratēgos, pursues with yet more vigour the war 
against the Lacedaemonians (4.42.1). Moreover, one might also question 
whether Cleon’s political power was enhanced commensurably to his 
spectacular success. Plutarch surely maintains that it was, 51  and the 
Clouds of Aristophanes, so far as the evidence from a play can fully be 
entrusted as historically accurate, suggests (581-94) that Cleon was 
elected stratēgos in the following year.52 However, Thucydides does not 
mention this, and indeed the only mention he makes of Cleon in office 
 
48 So Thibaudet 1922: 36; de Romilly 1963: 156; Woodhead 1960: 314; Baldwin 1968: 
214. 
49 Cf. Ar. Eq. 973-76: ἥδιστον φάος ἡμέρας / ἔσται τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ / τοῖσι δεῦρ’ 
ἀφικνουμένοις,/ ἢν Κλέων ἀπόληται (Sweetest will the bright daylight be / for both 
those already in town / and those who are to come / if Cleon gets lost). But this comedy 
was staged in 424 while Cleon was still alive. 
50  Cf. Classen & Steup 1900: vol. 4, 64. ‘indem Cleon, wenn sein Versprechen sich nicht 
erfüllte, jedenfalls seine politische Rolle ausgespielt haben würde’. See also Grote 
1872: 251. 
51 See Nic. 8.5 (above n. 33) and cf. also Ar. Eq. 280, 702, 709, 766, 1404 (all referring 
to Cleon’s free meals at the Prytaneion). 
52 So Dover 1968: lxxxi and 174 (on l. 582); Westlake 1968: 61; Kagan 1974: 250, 260 
and n. 1; Mitchell 1991: 171 and 188. 
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again is with regard to the Amphipolis expedition in 422.53 That Thucyd-
ides suppressed Cleon’s election as stratēgos in 424 – a fact that could eas-
ily be verified or disproved – due to his bias and antipathy toward him is 
not at all convincing and, in any case, Gomme (1956b: 506, 526-27) is par-
ticularly meticulous on this matter and gives very plausible reasons why 
Cleon could not have been one of the ten generals in 424.  
Finally, were the sōphrones justified in expecting that Cleon’s com-
mand at Pylos would probably lead to his physical or political extermi-
nation? If the able and resourceful Demosthenes, the commander in 
charge of the operations there, had already unsuccessfully attempted a 
landing on Sphacteria, the Athenians would perhaps have had some 
grounds for believing that Cleon could not fare any better. Such an at-
tempt, however, had not taken place, according to Thucydides’ account: 
once the Lacedaemonian proposals for peace, after their mishap in 
Sphacteria, had been turned down and the envoys went back to Sparta 
(4.17-23.1), the war was resumed, but it was trench warfare, so to speak, 
with no party gaining or losing anything substantial: the Spartans kept 
ineffectually assailing the Athenian fortress at Pylos, and the Athenians 
kept sailing round Sphacteria, so that the entrapped Spartan contingent 
might not be able to escape. Cleon, however, probably in some collabo-
ration, not necessarily secret, with Demosthenes, as we shall see, pro-
poses now something quite different: immediate and drastic action. He 
reproves the Athenians for needless dallying and urges them to invade 
the island and capture the Spartans. This easy business, he alleges, taunt-
ingly pointing at Nicias, our generals should have already accomplished, 
if they were real men,54 and this was, in any case, what he himself would 
have done, had he been in command (4.27.5).  
What follows is well-known: Nicias, feeling gravely insulted by 
Cleon’s insinuation of cowardice, offers to relinquish the command to 
him so that he may try his own way. But he does so – and this point is as 
a rule suppressed – only after the people of the assembly, the dēmos, with 
 
53 See also Grote’s (1872: 369) remark to the same effect: Cleon ‘obtained no command 
during this immediately succeeding period’ [sc. after his achievement at Pylos]. 
54 For the added ‘real’ in the translation (4.27.5 in n. 13) see Rhodes 1998: 226, Kagan 
2009: 132, and note that such appeals to masculinity are already known from Homer: 
cf. Il. 5.529, 6.112 etc. See also Eur. El. 693. 
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shouts challenged Cleon to sail to Pylos himself, since this operation 
seemed so easy to him.55 As Robert Connor (1984: 116) rightly remarks, 
‘almost any Greek male would be outraged by such an insult and chal-
lenge his critic to do better’. Plutarch, however, and several modern 
scholars have severely criticized Nicias’ conduct here, regarding it as 
tantamount to treason, since he offered the command to someone with-
out military experience and of whose failure he was certain.56 But there 
is no evidence whatsoever that Nicias believed that Cleon would cer-
tainly fail, much though Thucydides would doubtless have included him 
among the sōphrones of that assembly. One might also with reason sup-
pose that Nicias gave up the command because he wanted either to com-
promise Cleon by calling his bluff or, taking into account the stalemate 
at Sphacteria, to give him in earnest the opportunity to try his own way 
and do some notable service to the city.57 Plutarch, after all, who is so 
critical of Nicias in this matter, clearly allows this possibility, whereas 
several modern scholars ignore his evidence here, and affirm that Nicias 
believed Cleon to be incompetent.58 On what evidence? Plutarch does not 
say such a thing, for what we read in the Nicias-Crassus Comparison is 
clearly the opinion of Plutarch and not of Nicias;59 and Thucydides him-
self, despite his prejudice against Cleon, makes no negative remark about 
Cleon’s strategic abilities before Amphipolis. In the final analysis, what 
options did Nicias really have before him after Cleon’s offensive innuen-
does? He must either act on his prodding and sail to Pylos himself or do 
 
55 See 4.28.1: Ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅ τι 
οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥᾴδιον γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καὶ ἅμα ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, 
ἐκέλευεν...τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι ἐπιχειρεῖν. Cf. Plut. Nic. 7.3: ...τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰπεῖν 
παρέστη· ‘τί δ’ ουχὶ καὶ νῦν αὐτὸς σὺ πλεῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας;’ Upon which Nicias 
offered to relinquish his command for him; see n. 59. 
56 Cf., for instance, Grote 1872: 251 and Vlachos 1970: 106: ‘Une telle attitude frise la 
trahison’. For Plutarch’s evidence see above n. 33. 
57 Cf. Plut. Nic. 7.4: Ὅ τε Νικίας ἀναστὰς ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλον στρατηγίας αὐτῷ, καὶ 
λαμβάνειν ὁπόσην βούλεται δύναμιν ἐκέλευσε, καὶ μὴ θρασύνεσθαι λόγοις 
ἀκινδύνοις, ἀλλ’ ἔργον τι τῇ πόλει παρασχεῖν ἄξιον σπουδῆς. 
58 See, for instance, Woodhead 1960: 314 and Vlachos 1970: 107. 
59 Cf. Nic.-Crass. Comp. 3.5: … τῇ Κλέωνος ἀπειρίᾳ καὶ θρασύτητι...στρατηγίαν 
ἐμπειρίας ἄκρας δεομένην παραδιδοὺς (‘handed over [sc. Nicias] to the inexperience 
and rashness of Cleon… a command requiring the utmost experience’ – Perrin’s transl. 
[Loeb]); cf. also Nic. 8.5 (n. 33). 
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what he actually did, in the belief that either Cleon was bluffing (in which 
case he would be ridiculed, should he refuse the command) or that his 
plan (Demosthenes’ plan in fact) might indeed precipitate the surrender 
of the Spartans. In any case, to carry out Cleon’s proposals himself would 
not be so honourable after he had been openly accused of cowardice, and 
in those circumstances, even if he were successful, part of his success 
would with justice be attributed to Cleon who had recommended that 
course of action. 
It appears, as I see things, that Thucydides’ text clearly suggests that 
in that assembly over the Pylos expedition Nicias tried to disparage Cleon 
by calling his bluff, in other words, by demonstrating the vanity of his 
challenge; so clearly that it prevents us from contemplating the possibil-
ity that Cleon with his bizarre behaviour might actually have tricked Ni-
cias into handing the Pylos command to him.60 Recently, Geoffrey Haw-
thorn (2014: 113) does not exactly revive the well-known theory that 
wants Cleon to be secretly collaborating with Demosthenes to this ef-
fect,61 but, as he puts it, Cleon ‘may have engineered the confrontation 
 
60 Note that Nicias did not quit his generalship, namely the office to which he had been 
elected; he only allowed Cleon to command this specific campaign; cf. 4.28.3: 
Νικίας...ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς (so also the ancient scholiast [Hude 1927: 245: 
ἐξίστατο: παρεχώρει]; cf. Mitchell 1991: 188 and Flower 1992: 42). In other words, 
Cleon’s role in Pylos was somewhat unofficial from the military point of view, because 
the actual commander there was Demosthenes, even though he was not an elected 
stratēgos either; so Grote 1872: 369, Gomme 1956b: 438; Westlake 1968: 107; Connor 
1984: 108. More recently, however, the dominant view has been that Demosthenes 
was a general-elect in the spring of 425 bound to officially enter office in the following 
mid-summer (see Kagan 1974: 220; Hornblower 1996: 152; Rhodes 1998: 207-8). Yet 
if these critics are right, the somewhat scorning attitude of the other two generals to-
wards Demosthenes (see 4.3 and cf. Westlake and Kagan above) is not easily under-
stood and rather seems to militate against their view. On the other hand, Strassler 1990: 
111-12, argues that the generals were not that contemptuous of Demosthenes (they 
reassured him that they would come later to help him; see 111 n. 4), but he is least 
convincing. 
61 Cf., e.g., Woodcock 1928: 103; Westlake 1968: 72n. 1; Connor 1984: 110, 116; Mitch-
ell 1991: 173 and n. 7. 
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to enhance his own reputation’.62 Indeed, Cleon’s conduct, after he had 
secured the command, in combination with his promise to capture or 
slaughter the entrapped Spartans, leaves this possibility wide open. 
Gomme (1956b: 469) remarks here: ‘Cleon’s immediate demand for light-
armed troops shows that he already had a good idea of what was wanted 
at Pylos’.63 I fully endorse this comment, but I would like to advance it to 
its logical conclusion: is it reasonable for one to imagine that Cleon, as 
soon as he was given the command, without having been to Pylos before, 
without knowing the terrain there, and with no military experience till 
then (as far as Thucydides allows us to know), should have demanded to 
take with him a specific military force (peltasts and archers), without be-
ing in some contact and understanding with Demosthenes, the com-
mander of the Athenian army at Pylos and the man who organized and 
directed all the operations there?64 It was Demosthenes, after all, the 
man whom he immediately chose as his fellow-commander for this en-
terprise, exactly because he had heard of his plans to land on Sphacteria; 
that much at least is recorded by Thucydides (4.29.1-2:… τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ 
στρατηγῶν ἕνα προσελόμενος, Δημοσθένη, … πυνθανόμενος τὴν 
ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖσθαι).65 
 
62 Similarly Flower 1992: 55. See also Connor 1984: 117 and cf. Westlake 1968: 73-74, 
esp. 74: ‘He [sc. Cleon] may have adopted the subterfuge of pretending to be unwill-
ing.’ If so, Cleon’s ‘strenuous protest’ against accepting the Pylos command (see Grote 
1872: 251 with n. 29) was a sham one. 
63 Cf. also Woodhead 1960: 315; contra Flower 1992: 55: Cleon ‘is simply exploiting a 
crisis for his own gain, without a clear policy in mind’. Besides, Flower 1992: 45 and 
47 offers a good answer (adopted also by Rhodes 1998: 227) to Kagan’s (1974: 241) 
question of how these light troops happened to be so conveniently in Athens at that 
time (‘open preparations for the implementation of Demosthenes’ plan had been un-
derway for some time’), although one might speculate and other reasons that do not 
necessarily presuppose some secret collaboration between Demosthenes and Cleon. 
64 Cf. also Connor 1984: 116: ‘Would someone who has just been forced into an unwel-
come command act in this way?’ Besides, let me add, Demosthenes was not at all 
disinclined to secret dealings and agreements, as 3.109.2 evinces. 
65 For Gomme 1956b: 471 this information was enough and ‘there is no need to suppose 
any secret understanding between him [sc. Demosthenes] and Cleon’ (cf. also Flower, 
above n. 63); Gomme is probably right for another reason: as Westlake 1968: 97 re-
marks, Thuc. was a colleague of Demosthenes in the board of stratēgoi in 424/23, 
perhaps also a relative of him by marriage (97 n. 3), held him in some esteem, and 
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Be that as it may, Cleon eventually accepted, as we saw, the command 
of the expedition to Pylos and even promised his compatriots that he 
would finish the job within twenty days; and he did deliver. Thucydides 
nonetheless, although he knows that Cleon’s promise was fulfilled, char-
acterizes it as mad (4.39.3: Καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα ἡ 
ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσι ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ 
ὑπέστη).66 ‘No sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides astonishes 
me so much as that in which he stigmatises such an expectation as “in-
sane”’, confesses Grote (260), who subsequently attributes this charac-
terization to the historian’s prejudice against Cleon. And so do most 
scholars.67 Yet, this passage can also be read from a different perspective. 
To my mind, for instance, Thucydides’ statement here, much though it 
apparently discredits his judgement and prestige, is ultimately to his 
credit and in fact comprises one of our best testimonies to his historical 
 
used him as a principal source (see also id. 1989: 205-6); how likely is it, then, that 
Demosthenes should have concealed from Thuc. his secret collaboration with Cleon? 
Be that as it may, the information above that Demosthenes was thinking of invading 
the island did not specify the nature of the troops required. Nor do we know for sure 
that Demosthenes had asked for reinforcements, although Grote’s (1872: 246-47 n. 1) 
remarks to the contrary are well-argued; when Cleon alerts Demosthenes that he is 
coming with the troops he had asked (ἔχων στρατιὰν ἣν ᾐτήσατο), we are not certain 
if the subject of the verb is Cleon or Demosthenes (see here Gomme 1956b: 473 on 
4.30.4). At 4.30.3 Thuc. tells us that Demosthenes was summoning troops from the 
allies in the neighbourhood (στρατιάν τε μεταπέμπων ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς ξυμμάχων), which 
might suggest that he did not ask for reinforcements from Athens, but Woodcock 1928: 
103 cogently argues that Cleon acted upon the instructions he had received from De-
mosthenes; so also Babut 1986: 72 with n. 39 ibid. and Flower 1992: 44-45 and 56. 
66 Unlike the common rendering ‘insane as Cleon’s promise was’, Connor 1984: 116 n. 
15 follows Schneider 1974: 21 n. 29 (‘das Versprechen, so wahnwitzig es aussah’) and 
makes the point that the suffix -ώδης gives the adjective a certain ambiguity (denoting 
as it does either fullness or similarity) which the translation should preserve: ‘although 
it had seemed quite crazy’. Hornblower 1994 and Rhodes 1998 ad loc. adopt his trans-
lation, but, in my view, the characterization of Cleon’s promise as μανιώδης, made 
after its fulfilment at that, represents not the Athenians’ impression, but the historian’s 
fixed and unequivocal opinion; cf. also de Romilly 1963: 172 n. 2. Had Thuc. meant 
to say that Cleon’s promise seemed (not was) mad to the Athenians (which might well 
have been the case also), he would have written, I think, δόξασα in lieu of οὖσα.  
67 See, for instance, Gomme 1956b: 478: ‘Thucydides’ bias is once more clear’; Wood-
head 1960: 314; Westlake 1968: 75; Kagan 1974: 247 n. 99; Schneider 1974: 21 n. 29. 
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scrupulousness. Of course did he dislike Cleon and was prejudiced 
against him,68 especially since he most probably held him responsible 
(with good reason more or less) for his exile following his failure to re-
cover Amphipolis.69 Yet what really matters, as far as historical trustwor-
thiness is concerned, is not the historian’s feelings as such, but whether 
these feelings make him tell lies about Cleon, suppress his successes70 or 
distort facts in order to present him in an unfavourable light or even 
slander him. Nor do Thucydides’ characterizations of Cleon as a most vi-
olent citizen (βιαιότατος at 3.36.6) and a demagogue (4.21.3) necessarily 
indicate bias, as Woodhead (1960: 311-12) would have us believe.71 No an-
cient source denies that Cleon was a violent demagogue and thus, insofar 
as the attributes biaiotatos and demagōgos describe Cleon accurately, the 
historian’s duty, Gomme (1962: 112) rightly argues, is to represent him 
as such, regardless, I would add, of the fact that the Athenian demos ap-
parently supported Cleon and followed his policies freely and gladly.72 
 
68 This is above everything else manifest in 5.16.1; cf. Gomme 1956b: 637, Baldwin 
1968, and see notably Woodhead 1960 passim, and Kagan 1974: 247 n. 99. But as 
regards the narrative in the Pylos episode, I would not agree with Westlake’s (1968: 
75) verdict that ‘all other considerations are subordinated to his desire to expose the 
unworthiness of Cleon’. 
69 See 4.104.4-106.3-4 and cf. Marcellinus’ Vita Th. 46; Grote 1872: 261; Gomme 
1956b: 585, 587; Kagan 1974: 299. Contra Pope 1988: 284, who argues that Thuc.’s 
hostility to Cleon cannot stem from a private reason but rather from a public, namely 
a political one (Cleon’s overall standing as a public figure). 
70 These successes are mostly connected with Cleon’s fatal expedition to Amphipolis, 
but only few of them are confirmed or actually supported by the historian’s narrative; 
see below. 
71 Cleon is a violent demagogue also in Diodorus (12.55.8: Κλέων ὁ δημαγωγός, ὠμὸς 
ὢν τὸν τρόπον καὶ βίαιος); cf. de Romilly 1963: 156 n. 1. Further, Kagan 1974: 156, 
234 with n. 53 ibid.; Rawlings 1981: 224; Westlake 1989: 207, and others argue that 
Thuc.’s introductions of Cleon at 3.36.6 and 4.21.3 are meant to present him in an 
unfavourable light, disregarding that he is also described as πιθανώτατος, a positive 
rather than negative characterization (see above n. 4). Connor’s 1984: 85 n. 15 estimate 
of these introductions of Cleon above is more balanced and more convincing. See also 
next note. 
72 So Kagan 2009: 161, who also shrewdly remarks that Thuc.’s account of Cleon’s ca-
reer ‘represents a radical revision of contemporary opinion’. On the other hand, it is 
worth reminding ourselves that all ancient evidence regarding Cleon is unanimously 
damning: besides Aristophanes and Plutarch, see Arist., Ath. Pol. 28.3, Theopompus 
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When Thucydides, then, describes Cleon’s promise as crazy in a passage 
where Cleon’s prediction is juxtaposed to his own, and where Cleon’s 
prediction and not his own came true in the end, he at the same time 
shows that any antipathy and bias he had do not interfere with his re-
spect for historical truth. For in all likelihood Thucydides was present, as 
we saw, in that notorious assembly and heard the arguments and coun-
ter-arguments set out during it; he was therefore in a position to see and 
assess for himself the mood of the people, and so he accurately, more or 
less, took it down for us. As Westlake (1968: 72) also notes, in connection 
with the second Pylos debate, ‘there is no reason to suspect that Thucyd-
ides has given a fictitious or distorted account of what actually happened 
in the course of the debate’.73  
In conclusion, I would further like to suggest another possible expla-
nation for Thucydides’ position at 4.28.5, namely, for the reaction of the 
sōphrones to Cleon’s promise; an explanation that is perhaps related to 
the well-known but insoluble problem regarding the composition of 
Thucydides’ work.74 That our historian often narrates or reflects on a cer-
tain event having in mind subsequent events or even the end of the 
whole war is beyond doubt;75 but how exactly and to what degree this a 
posteriori knowledge affects, sometimes perhaps unawares, his judge-
ment or the shaping and flow of his narrative is a moot point. In this par-
ticular case I would suggest that, speaking as he does about Cleon and the 
 
115 F 92-94 (Jacoby 1962: 556), and Luc. Hist. conscr. 38; that a descendant of Cleon 
took pride in him (Ps.-Dem. 40.25) barely changes the overall picture, and certainly 
constitutes no evidence of ‘a pro-Cleon tradition after Thucydides’, as Baldwin 1968: 
214 n. 24 contends. 
73 See also above p. 125-26 and n. 21. And as Pope 1988: 284-85 more generally ob-
serves, Thucydides is not ‘guilty of manipulating [sc. the public figures] so as to give 
an unfavourable impression. We shall find him innocent, a reporter not a propagan-
dist’. 
74 Cf. de Romilly 1963: 6. On this important issue see briefly Dover 1973: 14-20 and 
Rawlings 1981: 250-54; in more detail: Finley 1940; de Romilly above: 187-92, 213-
29, 262-70, 275-86; Pohlenz 1968; Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1981: 361-444; cf. 
also Hornblower 1996: 119-22 and 2008: 1-4, 41-57. 
75 As de Romilly 1963: 188 argues, when Thuc. underlines and stresses some ideas in 
book 4, it is because ‘of the greater significance given to them by later events’; cf. also 
Rawlings 1981: 252. Some other passages indicating knowledge of later events: 1.8.1; 
13.3; 18.1, 119-24, 142-43; 2.65.5-13, 100.2; 4.48.5, 81.2, 108.4; 5.26; 6.15.3. 
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conservative Athenians, Thucydides is anticipating or rather projecting, 
by way of wishful thinking perhaps, what happened three years later, 
namely Cleon’s failure to recover Amphipolis, his poor and superficial 
strategy there, and his rather inglorious death on the battlefield.76 The 
events of Pylos, at any rate, were certainly written after 422, that is to 
say, after the Amphipolis campaign and during the peace of Nicias; and 
according to some scholars, even after 404 when the whole war was 
over.77 
Prima facie, one should not expect any similarity between the opera-
tions at Sphacteria and Amphipolis; if for no other reason, because no 
island and no naval force are involved in the latter. Nevertheless, the two 
campaigns have been linked together through their common denomina-
tor, Cleon, by Thucydides himself. Speaking somewhat contemptuously 
about Cleon’s strategy at Amphipolis (5.7), the historian says that he 
acted in the same way as he had acted with success at Pylos and so had 
acquired confidence in his own wisdom,78 the ultimate implication being 
 
76 However, according to Diodorus 12.74, Cleon fought bravely at Amphipolis. But since 
all generals fight and fall with bravery in Diodorus (see Westlake 1968: 81 and n. 2), 
this testimony is of little or no value, given also Diodorus’ very poor account of the 
battle of Amphipolis (see Grote 1872: 380 n.1 and cf. Kagan 1974: 299 n. 141). Grote 
1872: 383-85 and Westlake 1968: 81-2 criticize both Cleon’s strategic incompetence 
in Amphipolis (cf. also Spence 1995: 423 with n. 34 ibid.) and his cowardice on the 
battlefield, but Gomme 1956b: 652 and Kagan 1974: 328-30 defend him on both 
counts (although Gomme 1962: 117-18 speaks of ‘Cleon’s poor generalship’ at Am-
phipolis); perhaps with some justice, given Thuc.’s prejudice against the author of his 
banishment. 
77 According to Gomme 1956b: 448-49, ‘not long after 421 B.C.’; according to Rawlings 
1981: 227, after 412, probably after 407; according to others, even after 404 (see 
Gomme above and cf. de Romilly 1963: 188-90). Ed. Meyer believed that the whole 
Pylos episode was written later on the basis of 5.29.3 (see de Romilly 1963: esp. 187-
88 nn. 2-3); cf. also 4.12.3 (ἐν τῷ τότε), 4.48.5 (ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε), 
4.74.4. De Romilly: 190 believes (in agreement with Meyer) that the Pylos episode 
was written after the Sicilian adventure, possibly between 407-404 (p. 191). 
78 Cf. 5.7.3: καὶ ἐχρήσατο [sc. Cleon at Amphipolis] τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον 
εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν. For the meaning of tropos here (plan/procedure or 
spirit/temper) see Gomme’s 1956b: 639-40. According to Balot 2017: 325 n. 4, it was 
due to his success at Pylos that Cleon became overconfident and hence made critical 
mistakes at Amphipolis, where he not only lost his own life but also squandered many 
of his ‘exceptional soldiers’.  
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that Cleon believed that he would carry Amphipolis by force as he had 
done with Sphacteria, but also, one might add, with Torone which he had 
similarly taken by storm only a few days earlier.79 Yet the way he con-
ducted the operations in Amphipolis and the miscalculations that he 
made, so far as Thucydides’ narrative allows us to judge correctly, was 
lamentable, although one can hardly turn a blind eye to the historian’s 
prejudice against Cleon here.80 Intriguing as they are, I will omit here the 
details of Cleon’s military plans and maneuvering,81 but I will pause on 
the comments of Gomme, who has drawn several parallels between the 
events at Pylos and Amphipolis, and especially between the respective 
narratives of Thucydides. The actual battles in particular must have been 
 
79 Several scholars adduce this accomplishment as one more example of Thuc.’s bias 
against Cleon, on account of which the historian is inclined to suppress the latter’s 
successes: e.g. Woodhead 1960: 304-5; Gomme 1962: 115; Westlake 1962: 287; Bald-
win 1968: 211-12; Kagan 1974: 319; Schneider 1974: 20 and n. 28. This may be true 
in some cases, but, as regards Torone, it is worth considering perhaps that its capture 
was an easy military operation, since Cleon had already been informed that Brasidas 
was away (5.2.3), the wall of the town was partly dismantled (4.112.2, 5.2.4; see 
Gomme 1956b: 631), and its inhabitants were too few to resist the Athenians (5.2.3: 
οὔτε οἱ ἐνόντες ἀξιόμαχοι εἶεν); moreover, the latter would attack from land and sea, 
so that the Spartan force of Pasitelidas would be unable to defend the town on both 
fronts at the same time (5.3.1-2). Yet, in discussing Torone’s capture, some critics set 
aside Thuc.’s curt and composed narrative and see instead a brilliant strategy on the 
part of Cleon (Kagan 1974: 321), the organizer of ‘a remarkable coup de main’ (Wood-
head 304). With all his admiration of Cleon, Grote 1872: 371 modestly speaks only of 
a ‘not unimportant success’; and rightly so, since Torone was not strategically that 
significant and this is why ‘Brasidas’ reputation is scarcely tarnished, and Cleon’s not 
at all whitened’ after its capture, as Gomme 1956b: 632 perceptively concludes. After 
all, since the aim of Cleon’s expedition was primarily the recovery of Amphipolis 
(Pritchett 1973: 379; Spence 1995: 432), Thuc. may not have thought it necessary to 
dwell on all Athenian operations and territorial gains in the area; let alone the possi-
bility (the certainty rather) that some of Cleon’s supposed successes (see mainly West 
& Merrit 1925 and Adcock 1927: 247-48) may actually never have been accomplished 
or may have taken place in other periods or occasions or after his death; cf. Gomme 
1956b: 636; 1962: 115 n. 2; Pritchett 1973; Mitchel 1991: 170, 179; Spence 1995: 426-
29. 
80 See above and nn. 67, 68, 76. 
81 For the relevant detailed accounts see Gomme 1962: 114-20 and Hornblower 1996: 
435-36 with more bibliography there. 
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very similar and, as Gomme (1962: 120) says, “with a very slight altera-
tion of language, just a shift of emphasis, a longer and more detailed ac-
count of Athenian casualties, the story of Amphipolis could have been 
made very like that of Sphacteria”.82 It may be just as possible then that, 
when Thucydides was writing that the sōphrones of the Athenians ex-
pected to rid themselves of Cleon during the Sphacteria operations, he 
had Amphipolis in mind.83 For indeed, as Grote (370) also remarks, the 
first alternative of the Athenian expectations concerning Cleon’s initia-
tive in the Pylos affair (see n. 28) was really the more probable at Am-
phipolis. In other words, Thucydides anticipated, and thus also presents 
the Athenian conservatives as anticipating, that Cleon, owing to his poor 
generalship as shown at Amphipolis three years later, would not be able 
to defeat the Spartans, while his frivolity and impetuousness could even 
expose him to mortal peril in a hand-to-hand battle, as was expected 
given the situation, with the most renowned Greek warriors.84 
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